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Abstract
Cooperation and competition are vital for human survival and for social progress. In this
study we examine the impact of external (environmental) and internal (individual differ-
ences) factors on the tendency to cooperate or compete in social conflicts. To this end, 53
young adults played blocks of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with each other or
with a computer. The environmental context was manipulated across blocks, by introducing
uncertainty, randomly losing or gaining money. Individual differences were assessed by par-
ticipants’ attachment style. We found that participants cooperated more when randomly los-
ing money compared to when randomly winning or in the neutral condition. Moreover, in a
negative uncertain environment, individuals with higher anxious and avoidant attachment
styles cooperated less. The above effects were only observed when playing against a
human and not a computer. Overall, the findings highlight the dependency of cooperative
behavior on the context as driven by external and internal factors.
Introduction
Cooperation and competition are vital for our survival in a complex social environment [1].
The tension between cooperative and competitive behavior is specifically emphasized in a con-
flict situation. An example is social dilemmas where the interests of the collective are in conflict
with the individual’s self-interest [2]. In traditional economic theories decisions are assumed
to reflect a ‘rational choice’, aimed to maximize individual gain [3]. However, many theories
and empirical findings have challenged this simplistic view [4,5]. Specifically, in the context of
social dilemma, cooperation is suggested to be driven by social factors [6–8], emotional con-
text [9–12] and personality traits [13–15]. In this study, we specifically focus on the impact of
the environmental uncertainty, and how individuals with different relational attachment style
react to it in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG).
Economic games such as PDG, Ultimatum Game (UG) and Dictator Game (DG) measure
individual’s responses in face of conflict between self-interest and collective interest. In the
PDG, unlike some of the other games (UG, DG) both players have equal status and role. The
players win or lose money based on their individual decisions to ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ (also
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referred to as ‘betray’ in the literature, we will use both terms interchangeably): if both players
decide to cooperate they will be better off than if both decide to betray. Conflict arises when
one player decides to cooperate while the other decides to betray, leading to an advantage for
the betrayer and a cost for the cooperator. In other words, deciding to cooperate in the PDG
means one must trust the opponent to cooperate as well, otherwise there is a risk to incur a
large loss. Hence, PDG is used to assess cooperation in the context of trust.
Social contract theory originally proposed by Hobbes [16] suggests that cooperative behav-
ior is one of the building blocks of societies. It postulates that despite an incentive to defect in
some scenarios (e.g. PDG), it is socially agreed that for long term mutual benefit it is best to
cooperate. Cooperation between humans is argued to be an evolutionary behavior that is cru-
cial to our species survival [17]. Indeed, in the context of PDG (both in the single and repeated
versions) cooperation is observed, although there is a large variability between studies in the
extent of cooperative behavior [18]. Unsurprisingly, cooperative behavior in PDG is greater
when playing against human partner as compared to when playing against computer partner
[8], highlighting the social aspect of the game.
Cooperation has also been hypothesized to depend on factors external to participants. Eco-
nomic hardship, food sparsity and limited foraging options has been anecdotally claimed to
cause humans to be either more or less cooperative. For example, it is suggested that exposure
to natural disasters leads to increased subsequent cooperation. Chantaral and colleagues [19]
tested altruistic behaviors after a flooding disaster. Using a DG, the authors showed that those
directly affected by the flooding were more generous compared to those who were not. There
is also evidence that traumatic experiences in a community can lead to more cooperation [20].
Similarly, it has been shown that a positive national event, like winning an international foot-
ball match, can lead to increased investments in national companies (increase in the FTSE 100
index when England wins [21]). Hence the external environment, or unexpected loss, may
influence human cooperation at least on short time scales. This short-term-effects maybe
mediated through changes in emotional states following the external events.
Over longer time scales, personality traits are likely to also affect cooperation. The ability to
trust others in daily interaction can be affected by an individual’s attachment style. The attach-
ment theory advocates that individuals interact with each other based on their internal rela-
tional “working model” developed in early childhood [22]. Attachment is categorized into
secure and insecure types and is described along two dimensional axes: anxiety and avoidance
[23]. Individuals with secure attachment score low on both the anxiety and avoidance axes.
Secure attachment is associated with positive, constructive and trustful social interactions.
On the other hand, individuals who have insecure attachment, tend not to trust others. Those
with high score on the anxiety axis are afraid of rejection and seek closeness at all times. Indi-
viduals with high scores on the avoidance axis emphasize their independence and avoid form-
ing relations.
Two studies investigated the impact of attachment on behavior in social dilemmas. Alma-
kias and Weiss [24] examined how avoidance and anxious attachment styles affect decisions in
the UG and DG. In contrast to the PDG, the relation between players in the UG and DG is
asymmetric and assumed to measure sensitivity to fairness. In the UG one participant pro-
poses a split of money, with a second participant holding a veto power, while in the DG the
receiver has no say over the split. In the Almakias and Weiss study, participants played 40
trials of a one-shot game with different fictitious partners, half as proposers (DG) and half as
receivers (UG). They reported that participants with anxious attachment style accepted smaller
offers in the UG while also making higher offers in the DG. The authors concluded that this
paradoxical behavior where anxious individuals always end up with less money than their
opponents (either as proposer or receiver) suggest they have lower sensitivity to fairness. It is
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argued that the desire of a high relational anxious individual to be loved and appreciated leads
them to reduce their own share and increases the other’s. On the other hand, participants with
avoidance attachment style show the opposite pattern–they made smaller offers whilst they
also rejected smaller offers (although this was not significant) suggesting that avoidance indi-
viduals have higher sensitivity to fairness, where they focus on protecting themselves from
exploitation.
In contrast, in social conflict with symmetric relations and where trust rather than fairness
is the focus, such as the PDG, individuals with anxious or avoidance attachment styles are
reported to be less cooperative [25]. This was shown using 2 trials of a one-shot prisoner
dilemma game (with two fictitious partners).
Attachment style not only affects the way people interact with others, but also affect the way
individuals respond emotionally to various situations [26]. Individuals with high anxious styles
show hyper emotional (positive and negative) response, while those with avoidant styles are
associated with deactivation of positive emotions [27]. In support of this, empirical studies
have shown that people with anxious relational attachment rated both positive and negative
stimuli as more intense, independent of the social content; those with avoidant style rated posi-
tive social (but not non-social) images as less pleasant [28]. It is suggested that emotions acti-
vate the attachment internal working model [29].
Two opposing views have been proposed on the impact of attachment style on cooperation
when in an uncertain/threatening environment. The affect reactivity and regulation model
[30] posits that in an uncertain negative environment, individuals with high avoidance will dis-
tance themselves from others, and hence are likely to cooperate less; while individuals who
have anxious relational style will seek more support, and hence potentially cooperate more.
Alternatively, it has been argued that in uncertain situation, in which the behavior of the part-
ner is unpredictable, individuals with insecure attachment (anxious and avoidance styles)
expect the worst, showing overall less trust leading to less constructive cooperative behavior,
even in repeated interactions [25].
The aim of the current study was to revisit cooperative behavior in the context of the social
dilemma, examining the impact of attachment style as an internal factor and of the environ-
ment (rich (positive), neutral or scarce (negative)) as an external factor. We used the PDG as a
manipulation of social dilemma because the relationship between the two partners is symmet-
ric. Hence, we expected the PDG to specifically tap into trusting others’ behavior which is
assumed to be impacted by the attachment style. To magnify the element of social trust in the
game and its emotional and social connotation, we describe the two choices in the PDG as
betray and cooperate. We used a repeated version of the PDG to allow reciprocal trust to be
triggered across multiple encounters. The PDG task included a manipulation of the environ-
mental context through unexpected monetary losses or wins. Thus, the PDG was played 1) in a
positive context, where participants randomly received additional money, 2) a negative con-
text, where money was randomly taken, and 3) in a neutral context where no money was won
or lost randomly. This external variable emulated a period of safety/economic growth or
threat/recession and would be expected to interact with the attachment style for cooperative
decisions. Finally, to rule out that any effect observed is not specific to social interactions we
manipulated the opponent; participants played against a real human (social) or a computer
(non-social) partner. Subjects were aware who their opponent was when they played. It is
important to note that in contrast to many studies using social dilemma games here partici-
pants interacted online with real humans whom they only briefly met at the beginning of the
experiment.
While the role of attachment has previously been examined for PDG in single games [25]
this is the first study to examine cooperation in repeated PDG where participants can build up
Attachment type and prisoner’s dilemma game
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trust over time, and the first study to examine how the cooperative effect of attachment style is
further influenced by uncertain or threatening environments.
Based on literature on threats and uncertainty we expected participants to cooperate less
when in a positive supportive context (randomly winning a sum of money) and more when in
a negative threatening context (randomly losing a sum of money) and this effect is expected to
be larger when playing against a human. How the internal factor (attachment styles) affects
cooperation is less clear; previous studies reported that both anxious and avoidance relational
styles trended toward less cooperation. We anticipated that external environmental factors
(specifically threat and uncertain negative outcomes) would magnify the effects of the internal
factors (the attachment style) on cooperative behavior; high avoidant attached participants
showing a decrease in social cooperation in response to negative context. The impact of envi-
ronment on the cooperative behavior of individual with anxious attachment style during inter-
actions is less clear. Furthermore, we expected all of these effects to be specific to interactions
with human participants, with generally lower cooperation with computer opponents.
Methods and materials
Participants and design
Sixty-two university students were recruited for the study. The criterion for inclusion was any
adults age 18 and above. Participants were tested in pairs, based on opportunistic matching.
Two participants who signed on to the same time slot played together, on the condition that
they did not know each other in advance. A follow up lifespan study (not reported here)
revealed that the impact of attachment style on cooperative behavior changes with age. There-
fore, in the current study we excluded 9 participants whose age was above 30yr. This resulted
in 53 participants, each of whom received £5 for their participation plus any additional money
they won during one of the blocks played in the game (see below). Participants were fully
informed about the task both in writing and verbally before giving their written consent. The
study procedure was approved by the University of Birmingham Science, Technology, Engi-
neering and Mathematics (STEM) Ethical committee.
The study design was a mixed design with partner (computer, human) and environmental
context (positive, neutral, negative) as within-subject factors and attachment styles (anxious,
avoidance) as between subject covariates.
Task
Participants played a modified version of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in pairs. The
aim of this game was to win as much money as possible. The amount of money that could
be won on each trial depended on both players’ decisions. On each trial participants had to
choose whether to ‘cooperate’ or ‘betray’ (by pressing 1 or 2 on the keyboard). If both partici-
pants cooperated they won 30 pence (30p) each; if both betrayed they lost 10p each. If one
betrayed whilst the other cooperated the one who betrayed won 50p and the one who cooper-
ated lost 30p (Fig 1). The payoffs were designed to encourage betrayals as this was associated
with the highest payoff assuming the other participant cooperated.
Participants played with either a real human partner (the other participant) or a computer
partner in separate blocks. At the beginning of a block they were informed whether they were
playing a human or a computer. The computer used a tit-for-tat strategy, collaborating in the
first trial, then subsequently performing the same choice as the participant’s previous decision.
However, to mask this strategy in 20% of the trials the computer made a random decision. The
use of the tit-for-tat strategy was done to emulate as much as possible the conditions of playing
with another human by emphasizing reciprocation. In addition, tit-for-tat is a well-known
Attachment type and prisoner’s dilemma game
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strategy that emphasizes initial cooperation, but which immediately responds to any deflection
by immediate mutual deflection. The strategy has been used to explain aspects of human deci-
sion making and has the advantage of being simple yet effective [10,11,31].
The environmental context was manipulated across blocks. We used three contexts: nega-
tive, neutral and positive contexts. In the negative blocks, random monetary loses (20p) were
introduced on 30% of the trials. In the positive blocks, random monetary wins (20p) were
introduced on 30% of the trials.
Subjects played with each partner (human or computer) in all three environmental con-
texts, for a total of 93 trials divided into six experimental blocks of 13 to 17 trials. The number
of trials per block varied between blocks to prevent the use of strategic decision making on the
last trials. The order of the six blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Experimental procedure
Participants were tested two at a time with the condition that they did not know each other
beforehand. At the beginning of the session, the instructions of the game were given to both
the participants in the same room. They were introduced to the aim and structure of the game
and the payoff table was clearly explained to them. The environmental and the partner manip-
ulations were also explained, and subjects were advised that this would be fixed across blocks
of trials. They were then taken to two separate rooms, where they would play the game. This
precluded any communication between participants during the game.
In separate rooms, participants practiced the task and the experimenter verified that they
understood it. The experimenter left the room before the actual game started, to ensure they
would not bias decisions.
Each block started by informing each subject of the type of partner they would encounter
(“In this block you will play against a computer (human) partner”). This stayed on the screen
until the participant was ready to start. Participants where then presented with the response
screen stating: “Waiting for your response, press 1 to cooperate or 2 to betray”. After both
players decided, a feedback screen appeared notifying both participants of their decisions and
the money won/lost for each (see Fig 2).
During the negative context block in 30% of the trials a screen with an unhappy red face
appeared after the feedback screen, displaying the following message: “Oops you have acci-
dently lost 0.2”. Similarly, during 30% of the trials under the positive context, after the
Fig 1. Payoff table. Each player had two options, cooperate or betray, and there are 4 outcomes based on both players’ decisions. The
payoff scheme is designed to encourage betrayal, as betraying assuming the other cooperates is associated with the highest gains, as in the
original PDG.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g001
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feedback screen a smiling green face was displayed with the message: “Congratulations, you
have won extra 0.2”. This context screen was displayed until the subject made a button
response.
For the analysis, we measured cooperation ratio, the number of trials where the decision
was to cooperate relative to the total number of trials in the block, and response time.
Attachment self-report
On the completion of the game, in the individual rooms, participants were asked to fill out 5
personality and trait questionnaires (UPPS+, BISBAS, RAAS, ECR and the Big five). For the
purpose of the current study we focused only on the questionnaires that assessed attachment
style.
Attachment was assessed in the context of intimate relationship using the Revised Adult
Attachment Scale (RAAS) [32]; and close relationship using the Experiences in Close Relation-
ships Inventory (ECR) [33]. RAAS and ECR measure anxious and avoidance attachment styles
in the context of adult relations. The RAAS was completed before the ECR. Example of ques-
tions assessing anxious style in the RAAS (6 Items) is: “I often worry that romantic partners
won’t want to stay with me”, and in the ECR (18 Items): “My desire to be very close sometimes
scares people away”. A question that assess avoidance style in the RAAS (12 Items) was: “I find
it difficult to allow myself to depend on others” and in the ECR (18 Items): “I find it difficult to
allow myself to depend on others”. In the RAAS participants responded using a scale of 1
Fig 2. Choice and feedback screen. Participants were presented with two options and the choice screen remained
until both participants made a response (pressing keys 1 or 2). Right side: Depending on the responses of both
participants one of four potential feedback screens were presented (2 seconds). In the positive & negative
environmental context there was a 30 percent chance of a screen informing subjects of a further random gain/loss,
before the beginning of the next trial.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g002
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(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree); in the ECR they responded using a scale of 1 to 5 (dis-
agree—to—agree, respectively). We used two questionnaires to assess attachment styles in
adulthood in order to increase the reliability of the self-reported measures.
In the analysis, we separated responses to questions that measure anxious and avoidance
styles. Given the relatively high overlap of the two questionnaires, the data was combined
using principle component analysis (PCA). For each sub-scale, we used the first component,
i.e. the one that explained the largest amount of the shared variability in these measures (see
Results below). Thus, each participant had one score reflecting the level of relational anxiety
and one score for relational avoidance attachment style. The attachment measures for rela-
tional anxiety combined of the RAAS and the ECR found high reliability (24 items; Cronbach’s
alphas α = 0.85). The Cronbach’s alpha for relational avoidance of the combined attachment
scores also found high reliability (29 items; α = 0.68).
Results
Attachment styles
The distribution of attachment style scores matched responses reported in the healthy popula-
tion [26] (RAAS-anxiety: mean = 2.72, median = 2.83; RAAS avoidance: mean = 2.81,
median = 2.75; ERC-anxiety mean = 3.41 and median = 3.29; ERC avoidance mean = 2.98 and
median = 3.11).
The scores from the two questionnaires showed high and significant correlation for the
RAAS and ECR relational anxiety sub scales, r = 0.79, p<0.001, as well as for the RAAS and
ECR avoidance scores, r = 0.56, p<0.001. The scores from the relational anxiety and avoidance
subscales on the other hand were near orthogonal, with no correlation between them on either
questionnaire (RAAS: r = -0.025, p>.05; ERC r = 0.25, p>.05). This demonstrates that the two
subscales assess different components of adulthood attachment styles.
To achieve a more reliable measure for the relational styles, we used PCA to extract the
shared component underlying the two questionnaires of each of the subscales. For relational
anxiety the shared component explained 84% of the data and was loaded on both the RAAS
and the ECR scales. For the relational avoidance style, the shared component explained 86% of
the variability and was loaded on both the RAAS and the ERC scales. The combined score on
each sub-scale was mean scaled before it was used as a covariate in the analysis. Fig 3 presents
the distribution of individual scores on each relational attachment styles (after they were
means scaled). The distribution of the combined relational avoidance score (on the right) was
slightly positively skewed, while for the combined relational anxious score (the graph on the
left), the distribution is approximately normal.
Validation of the environmental manipulation
Participants played the game in three environmental contexts: negative, neutral and positive.
To validate the impact of environmental manipulation we used two methods: 1) explicit ques-
tions: we asked a sub-sample of 26 participants to report their emotional responses for receiv-
ing random wins or losses. This was done after completing the experiment. Of this sub-sample
54% reported that they were not emotionally affected by the manipulation; and 35% reported
positive feeling (e.g. joy, encouragement) after receiving a random win; while 23% reported
negative feeling (e.g. annoyed, frustration) after receiving a negative loss; some participants
were affected by both negative and positive environmental manipulation. Thus, the self-
reported data suggested that while subjects were clearly aware of the manipulation only about
half of the participants admitted or were consciously aware of being affected by the environ-
mental manipulation.
Attachment type and prisoner’s dilemma game
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The second method for validating the environmental manipulation was an implicit measure
of response time (RT). Here it was assumed that a consistent change in RT in response to the
environmental manipulation will reflect a change in participants’ internal states. The analysis
excluded four participants that presumably initiated their response before the decision slide,
showing average responses below 10ms; for the rest of the 49 participants, decision time took
longer than 500ms.
The decision time data was used in a 2 (partner: computer, human) � 3 (context: negative,
neutral, positive) ANCOVA test with attachment as covariate. The type of partner marginally
affected response times to decide, F (1, 46) = 3.47, p = 0.08, pη2 = .065. More importantly there
was a main effect of environmental context, F (2,92) = 5.76, p<0.01, pη2 = .11, Participants
were fastest to make a decision during the neutral context blocks, mean = 1041.65ms,
std = 72ms, and slowest during the positive, mean = 1238.31ms, std = 79ms, while decisions
during the negative environmental blocks were in between, mean = 1157.43ms, std = 73ms.
The effect of the environmental context depended on the type of partner, F (2,92) = 3.56,
p<0.05, pη2 = 0.072. The interaction showed that the environmental context affected decision
times only when playing with a human, where relative to the neutral context decision times
were slower in the negative, t (48) = -3.2, p<.005, and the positive, t (48) = -3.2, p<.005, con-
texts. When playing with a computer, the environmental manipulation had no effect, t (48) =
-.298, p = .7. This suggests that the environmental context primarily affected decisions in the
social context (Fig 4).
Effect of environmental context and relational styles on cooperation
Based on our hypotheses we focused on the proportion of times participants cooperated in
each condition. We used an ANCOVA with partner and environment as repeated factors and
attachment type as a covariate. The data showed a clear effect of partner, F (1, 50) = 28.56,
p<.001, pη2 = 364, participants were more likely to cooperate with a human than with a
computer partner (Fig 5). There was no significant main effect of the environmental context,
Fig 3. Relational attachment. Distribution of relational avoidance and anxious attachment styles in the shared PCA score. Low score means less secure
attachment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g003
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F (2, 100) = 2.19, p>.05, pη2 = 0.041, but more interestingly a significant interaction between
the environmental context and the type of partner, F (2, 100) = 4.93, p<.05, pη2 = .09. Further
analysis showed that the interaction emerged because the environment only affected partici-
pants when playing with a human partner, F (2, 100) = 4.65, p<.05, pη2 = .085, but not when
playing with a computer partner: there was more cooperation in the negative environment as
compared to neutral, t (52) = 2.91, p<.05 and marginally more cooperation compared to posi-
tive environment, t (52) = 1.77, p = .08. This effect was not significant when playing against a
computer (Fig 5).
Avoidance or anxious relational style did not reliably affect the overall proportion of coop-
eration, F (1, 50) = 3.25, p = .077, pη2 = .061; F (1, 50) = .11, p = .74, pη2 = .002, respectively.
Fig 4. Response time when playing against a human and a computer. Response time when playing against a human
and a computer partner across the three environmental contexts. Subjects were slower in the negative and positive
environments when playing against a human partner. The error bars are standard errors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g004
Fig 5. Cooperation with human and computer. Proportion of collaboration with human and computer partner
across the three environmental contexts. Subjects collaborated more with human than computer partner and were
overall less likely to cooperate in the positive environment (see main text). The error bars are standard errors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g005
Attachment type and prisoner’s dilemma game
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There was also no interaction between the type of partner and the relational style. However,
avoidance relational style affected the response to the environmental context, F (2, 100) = 3.19,
p<.05, pη2 = .060. There was also a three-way interaction of partner and environment with
anxious, F (2, 100) = 4.37, p<.05, pη2 = .080 and a trend of three-way interactions of partner
and environment with avoidance, F (2, 100) = 2.37, p = .098, pη2 = .045 relational styles. Post-
hoc power analysis suggests that for the interaction effects observed in the data the power of
the current study was higher than .70 for the relational anxiety and higher than .58 for the rela-
tional avoidance.
Our a-priori hypothesis concerned the effects of attachment style on the pattern of coopera-
tion when playing with human in a negative environment. Therefore, the follow up analyses
focus on this question. We computed for each partner condition a differential environmental
context score. This was done by subtracting the cooperation scores in negative and positive
conditions from neutral condition. We then correlated these differential cooperation scores
with the anxious and avoidance relational styles. To correct for the multiple comparisons, we
used Bonferroni correction (corrected p value: .05/4 = .0125). For the anxiety relational style,
the results showed that when playing with a human partner, high anxious individual tended
to cooperate less when in a negative emotional state than when in a neutral emotional state,
r (n = 53) = 0.41, t (52) = 3.24, p<.125, (Fig 6). Similarly, for the avoidance relational, when
playing with a human partner high avoidance individual were less likely to cooperate when
in the negative state than in the neutral state, r (n = 53) = 0.48, t (52) = 3.94, p<.0125. No sig-
nificant result was found for the positive minus neutral contrast. When playing with a com-
puter, cooperation ratio during the positive or negative versus the neutral states was not
affected by anxiety or the avoidance relational styles.
In the current experiment, participants played with other participants in half the trials. This
means that, like in real life, the behavior of any given participant depended to a degree on their
partner’s and the relationship they formed in the game. In other words, the participants cannot
be considered as fully independent samples, as their responses were dependent on the pairing.
Fig 6. Correlation between shared PCA attachment scores and cooperation ratio. Differences in the cooperation ratio across negative and neutral environmental
contexts correlated with shared PCA components for attachment relational score. High anxious individuals (on the left panel) tended to cooperate less when in a
negative environmental context than when in a neutral environmental context. High avoidance individuals (on the right panel) were less likely to cooperate when in
the negative context than in the neutral context.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205730.g006
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The lack of independence violates ANOVAs assumptions and may have led to inflation of the
degrees of freedom. To ensure the pattern of results was not affected by this procedure, we ran
two additional analyses: 1) A non-parametric analysis where independence between measures
is not assumed; 2) An analysis where the averaged pair performance was the random variable.
The non-parametric analysis used Friedman’s two- way analysis of variance by ranks: with
the 2 types of partners by 3 environment conditions. The model was significant (p<.0001)
showing that the distributions of the data across the conditions were not the same. A follow up
analysis showed that the average collaboration ratio when playing with a human was reliably
higher than when playing with a computer (p<.001). Participant also collaborated more when
playing with a human in the negative context than in the neutral context (p<.015). There was
no reliable difference between negative and positive (p = .117) or neutral and positive (p =
.451). Environment also affected the way participants played with the computer, showing less
cooperation in the positive relative to the negative environment (p<.012), but no difference
between the positive and negative (p = .202) and the negative and neutral environmental con-
ditions (p = .423).
Finally, we used Spearman rho correlations to confirm the relations between cooperation
ratio in the various conditions (neutral–negative; neutral–positive) and individuals’ reported
attachment style. While at the group level, participants increased their cooperation when faced
with adverse environment, this effect was diminished for high relational anxious (Spearman
Rho = .356, p = .009) and for high relational avoidance (Spearman Rho = .499, p<.001) partic-
ipants. Individual difference in attachment style did not affect the pattern of cooperation with
computer or in the positive (vs. neutral) environment (p>.184).
In a second analysis we treated the pairs as the random factor, rather than the participants.
The response of 22 pairs and their attachment scores were averaged (we excluded participants
whose partner was excluded from the analysis due to age). ANCOVA with the factors partner
and environment as repeated factors and attachment type as a covariate revealed a similar pat-
tern. Participants were more likely to cooperate with a human than with a computer partner
F (1, 19) = 12.52, p<.005, pη2 = .397, and the interaction of partner and environment affected
the collaboration ratio, F (2, 38) = 3.66, p<.05, pη2 = .162. Follow up analysis showed that
environment affected cooperation with human, F (2,38) = 3.33, p<.05, pη2 = .149, but not
with computer partner.
The average attachment style of the pair also modulated cooperation dependent on the
environment when playing with human but not with computer partner (p>.2). Specifically,
when playing with a human, responses to the environment were affected by the averaged rela-
tional anxiety of the pair, F (2,38) = 3.672, p<.05, pη2 = .162; and the averaged relational
avoidance, F (2,38) = 4.096, p<.05, pη2 = .177. Follow up analysis showed that the increased
correlation during negative (vs. neutral), observed at the group level was diminished for pairs
with high average of relational anxiety (r = .539, p = .01) and avoidance (r = .615, p = .002)
Taken together the data suggest clear effects of partner type and environment which were
modulated by individuals’ relational attachment scores. These results were also observed using
non-parametric statistical analysis, or when using reduced study power by considering the
pairs rather than the individuals as the random factor.
Discussion
In this study, we considered the effect of environmental context and attachment style on
human cooperative decision-making in social and non-social contexts. We hypothesized that
people make different decisions in a social conflict situation based on their attachment style
and influenced by the environment. To test our hypothesis, we employed a modified version
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of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and attachment questionnaires. Importantly,
participants were tested two at a time to increase the validity of the social interaction and
played multiple games with each other under different environmental contexts. We then com-
pared individual differences in their cooperative behavior when playing with real human (the
other participants) and computer partner under negative, neutral, and positive environmental
contexts. Unsurprisingly we found that cooperation was higher when playing against a real
human than a computer, but only, when playing with a real human did cooperation increase
in the negative environment. High levels of relational anxious and avoidance styles were asso-
ciated with tuning down the latter effect; reducing cooperative behavior in the negative con-
text. We discuss these findings in the following sections.
Effect of partner; playing with human or computer
Overall participants were more cooperative when playing with human partner as compared to
computer partner. This finding is in line with previous research [6–8], and merely reflects the
social aspect of the game. We observed that cooperation with human partner was higher, even
though we used a repeated version of PDG (with a mean of 50 trials) that is shown to decrease
cooperation [34].
It is worth noting that participants were matched to each other based on opportunistic sam-
pling. Two participants signed up to each experimental time slots, and if they did not know
each other they would proceed to play against each other. Participants were conscious that
their decisions could affect the responses of the other, which potentially affected their tendency
to cooperate. In our experiment, information gathered from post-experiment interviews of
participants suggests that some were under the impression that humans in general are more
cooperative and that they could influence their human partner’s decisions but not the comput-
er’s. Hence, they believed that the computer was programmed to respond randomly (whilst
the computer was programed to play a tit-for strategy in 80% of the trials, however participants
were blind to this). Unsurprisingly, beliefs regarding the ability of one’s response to affect the
response of the other player is important for cooperation.
A caveat of the above procedure is that differences in cooperation ratio between playing
with a human or computer partner can be due to multiple reasons, which we cannot dissociate.
For example, cooperation may be affected by 1) participants’ belief about the identity of their
partner and the social acceptability of defecting; 2) their belief about the ability to modulate
the behavior of their partner; and 3) while the computer played tit-for-tat with noise, real
humans may not be as reciprocal. Thus the strategy of a computer opponent may have been
qualitatively different than that of a human, despite the overall high performance of the tit-for-
tat strategy [31].
Effect of environmental contexts on cooperative responses
In this study, we manipulated the environmental context as an external factor, by introducing
blocks with random monetary rewards or losses. Overall, in blocks when participants ran-
domly lost money (negative context) they cooperated more as compared with the blocks
where they randomly won money (positive context) or the neutral blocks. This effect was
more reliable when playing against a human partner as compared to computer partner. In
other words, participants betrayed more (potentially showing selfish behavior) in a rewarding
or predictable environment compared with a threatening uncertain environment.
Human prosocial behavior often increases under negative circumstances. A good example
of such altruistic and cooperative behavior can be seen in societies after natural disasters or
wars [20]. Likewise, during periods of austerity less fortunate economic groups may be placed
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under extra negative emotional stress, which anecdotally may lead to more cooperative behav-
ior [19].
From a cognitive perspective, the finding partially also supports the affect information
processing idea [9,35]. This theory suggests that negative emotions (as elicited by threats and
uncertainty) promote prosocial behavior, as individuals analytically analyze the details of the
task and direct their attention to the external environment. Hence, participants are more
likely to realize the long-term benefit of cooperation and consider the opponent and social
norms when making decisions. However, the affect processing information also suggest that
positive emotions leads to an optimistic view of outcomes, reliance on heuristics and atten-
tion to internal state. This often promotes less cooperative behavior as an individual may
seek easy gain.
In the current study a positive supportive environment (winning random money) did not
affect cooperative decisions. This is surprising, as the emotional validation measures (the anal-
ysis of the subjective reports and RT) showed larger impact of the positive (randomly winning
money) than the negative (randomly losing money) environment. The literature on this aspect
is less clear and it could be that in the context of trust games positive emotions do not affect
pro-social decisions [11]. Thus further research is needed to clarify the impact of positive sup-
portive environments on decision making during social dilemmas.
Cooperation and rational attachment based on different environmental
context
We found that relational style modulated the impact of random monetary loss (inducing nega-
tive mood) on cooperative behavior. While on average participants tended to cooperate more
with their human partner during monetary loss blocks, those with higher relational anxious or
avoidance scores were less likely to cooperate in the negative context as compared to the neu-
tral environmental context when in the social context and playing with a human partner. In
other words, relationally anxious and avoidance participants were found to react to this nega-
tive environmental context by behaving less cooperatively with their human partner. These
finding accords with a report that individuals with insecure attachment tend to trust less ini-
tially, and following repeated interactions [36].
The observation that individuals with high avoidance relational style make less pro-social
behavior accords with previous observations [24,36]. McClure and colleagues (2013) show that
individual with high relational avoidance tended to cooperate less in the PDG. They reported
that individuals with high relational avoidance tended to show more selfish behavior in the
UG (less generous offer) and were less likely to accept offers in the DG. In both these previous
studies the effects were weak and unreliable. One important difference between these previous
observations and the current study is the introduction of the environmental manipulation.
Indeed, we observed the impact of relational avoidance on decision only in the negative envi-
ronment. As emotions linked with the environment are assumed to trigger the attachment
style’s working model [24] it is likely that manipulation increased the impact of attachment on
behavior. It is possible that relational avoidant participants’ decision to cooperate less is driven
by fear of betrayal which increases in a negative environmental context. This could also be an
indication of their difficulties in regulating their negative emotions and its impact on their
interpersonal strategies as a result [30].
Like high relational avoidance, we observed that high relational anxious participants also
cooperate less. This finding accords with the observation of McClure and colleagues [25],
showing less cooperation in PDG. As above, McClure at al. reported the effects of relational
anxiety on decision were weak and unreliable. Though here, through the introduction of the
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environmental manipulation the effects were larger and more robust. The current finding may
appear to contradict those reported by Mikulincer et al. [27]. The latter report that relational
anxious behaved in an opposite way to the relational avoidance participants, making more
generous offers (UG) and accepting lower offers (DG). It is possible that differences in the rela-
tionship structure between the two players in these games can explain the apparent discrep-
ancy of the findings. As mentioned in the introduction, the ultimatum and the dictator games
are based on asymmetric power relations, where resources are held by one of the participants
and responses are made based on known (DG), or partly predictable (UG) behavior of the
other. While in the prisoner’s dilemma game, there is symmetry in power, the behavior of the
other is less predictable, and trust between equals determines the distribution of the rewards.
Thus, it could be that relational anxious individuals, being less trustful especially in a negative
context are less likely to cooperate when the behavior of the other is less predictable. Another
important contextual difference is the possibility to lose money in the PDG, while in the UG
and DG one cannot lose money, but just not gain a reward. Thus, the impact of loss aversion
on interpersonal trust is likely to be larger in the PDG. In PDG, if an anxious attached partici-
pant decides to cooperate whilst the other participant betray, the cooperative player loses more
money (30p in our game), and if they both betray, they both lose smaller amount (10p in our
game). The potential of loss is higher for a cooperating decision. However, in the ultimatum
game if an anxious participant offers bigger amount and gets rejected (that is less likely) by the
other player, they both get nothing, and if they reject smaller offer, they also get nothing. The
ultimatum game thus does not allow for monetary loss (just lack of rewards), which might be
more frightening or upsetting. As above, the inclusion of the mood manipulation is likely to
have affected the result. The high sensitivity to the negative signals (random loss of money)
by anxious attached individuals triggered their attachment system and therefore resulted in
untrusting behavior due to fear of betrayal [24].
Taken together, we suggest that people with relational anxiety or avoidance perceived ran-
dom loses in the negative environmental context as threat signals, significantly affecting their
behavior; this was particularly seen in the social context, meaning when they were playing with
their human partner and not with the computer partner. We propose that negative environ-
mental context triggers the attachment system in both anxious and avoidant individuals and
results in defensive behaviors, such as betrayal of their human partner.
Less cooperative behavior in negative environmental context in both anxious and avoidant
relational style could be also due to an individual’s internal working models., as suggested by
Bowlby [23]. Based on his theory an internal working model affects how we perceive and react
to the environmental cues. This can be also explained by Bartholomew’s four dimensions
model of attachment, according to which people who have a negative model of self and nega-
tive model of others are in the high anxiety axis [37]. According to Mikulincer, Shaver and
Pereg people with high attachment anxiety have difficulties in regulating their negative mood
and impulses [27].
Limitations of our study and suggestions for future research
One limitation of our study, shared with most versions of the PDG, was the un-natural condi-
tions of the experiment. Whilst in our study we tried to simulate the conditions that people
have to make a decision in a conflicting situation with the minimum knowledge of their
unknown partners, this was however done over computers and within experimental cubicles.
While social interactions involving trust in a computer-based environment are now quite
common, it would nevertheless be interesting to study human decision-making in a more
natural and social environment. We do note though that, in contrast to many other studies,
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participants in this study met their opponent at the briefing session, highlighting the social
context of the study while potentially allowing for less precise control over experimental
conditions.
To further encourage social cooperation, we explicitly referred to the two choice options for
the subject as ‘cooperate’ and ‘betray’. This is in contrast to the way the task is often presented
[13] where the two options are merely referred to as ‘A’ and ‘B’ (e.g.) without any specific con-
notations. In our study, we wanted to explicitly engage attachment related systems of partici-
pant, hence these terms were beneficial.
The environmental manipulation, done by providing a random monetary gain or loss, may
not necessarily have affected our participants. Though only slightly more than 50% reported
being explicitly affected by the manipulation, average RT showed an effect of the manipulation.
It could also be that the environmental manipulation and the experimental outcome con-
founded each other, as both were associated with monetary wins and losses. For example, the
impact of random loss on mood may have been magnified following a loss during the trial, or
lessened following a gain in the trial.
As participants played iterative games (~18 games x 3 blocks) with each other, we often
observed that results tended to converge on either Nash equilibria. In other words, in many
blocks participants’ responses were of mutual cooperation or mutual defection, hence there
was relatively little variability and exploration in these blocks. This obviously hinders the abil-
ity, and reduces the power, of the study to test the impact of external and internal factors on
cooperative behavior, due to ceiling or floor effects.
Lastly, it is hard to isolate the behavior of one participant in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game as the behavior of one player affects the other player’s behavior, and vice versa. This
leads to a unique pattern between the two players. Hence the interactions between two players
are never random, but exhibit some kind of heterogeneity and potentially depend on the
formed relation and impression made initially and through the game. For example, it is likely
that an individual will change their cooperation tendency as a function of their opponent in a
game, irrespective of their relational attachment style. Therefore, across participants the games
were not fully equated, adding unaccounted variability to the measurement. However, the only
way to void this is issue is to artificially control the opponent player (e.g. as hidden computer
player), which will lessen the ecological validity.
Conclusions
The current study showed that both environmental context and its interaction with attach-
ment style affect our cooperative behavior in a social conflicting situation such as PDG.
Specifically, the data suggests that whilst a negative environmental context facilitates human
cooperation in general, it has a negative impact on both avoidance and anxious attached
individuals and results in their decreased cooperative behavior. These results highlight the
interaction between environment and attachment as important factors for individual decision-
making.
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